Well according to some so-called “facts” appearing in a recent New York Times article (by B. Stein), that “meltdown” is just is not happening. It is all a mass hallucination experienced by a falsely alarmed and grossly misinformed public. The article declares that of the ten-plus trillion dollars in outstanding mortgage loans, only less than fifteen percent of them (less than 1.5 trillion bucks worth) are subprime loans. [I.e., Subprime: Loans offered at an interest rate above prime to those unfortunates who are less than qualified for prime rate borrowing, in other words, “sub prime” borrowers, not sub prime loans.] Subprime mortgages may carry interest rates of perhaps only 0.1 higher than prime, which seemingly tiny difference translates to thousands of dollars in additional costs to borrowers and higher profits to lenders). The bulk of all mortgage loans, the article goes on to insist are not subprime and therefore have a much lower foreclosure rate. I guess the conclusion drawn here is that if only half of the sub prime loans are in, or headed for, foreclosure?why worry about a measly little forty or fifty billion dollars being ripped from the country’s coffers? Nevertheless, that dinky little number is growing because of the folly of so many greedy lenders during the market boom of the first part of the new millennia. That is: “Hey guys, let’s loan out 90 and 125 of the property’s verifiable true Fair Market Value. So, how does anyone make any money this way, one might ask. Allow me to give you an example of a typical transaction of this type?and see for yourself if truly helping someone with onerous penalties and forfeitures can make an investor benefactor some decent money.The Analogy: -It is imperative that the homeowner-in-default satisfactorily demonstrate for the benefactor that the credit problem leading to the default was temporary in nature and with logical cause, and that it has since been rectified with a good likelihood of not recurring. -The homeowner must provide a current credit report with explanations for each negative entry-a brief sentence or two for each one re. why the problem happened and why it shouldn’t happen again.-The homeowner must be given current comps (comparative market analysis) to sign and date, acknowledging his/her understanding of the true value of the property at inception, along with a statement on the form in his own writing, acknowledging an understanding of the direction that real estate values might be heading (up or down)-It must be clearly stated in the contract that there is no guarantee of any specific ROI (Return on Investment)-Let’s say the subject property is valued at - $320,000-And that the homeowner is 3 payments in arrears ($2250 each)-The current loan balance is $250,000, including penalties and arrearages-In addition to the amount to bring the loan current ($7,750), the investor benefactor deposits an additional refundable $5,700 with the trust, with which to create a Contingency Fund (i.e., for the potential of eviction and/or minor emergency repairs): this amount also includes $1,200 that is earmarked for making part of the monthly payment for a while, therefore reducing the homeowner’s aggregate monthly (PITI) mortgage obligation by $100 for the first year (or perhaps by $200 per-month for half of the first year) -The parties establish a Mutually Agreed Value (MAV) at inception in the mount of, say, $375,000 (10) equity sharing arrangement, this would constitute a total return of $76,200, for a net profit of $62,750 over an original contribution of $13,450 (4-500 of that disparity between the starting MAV and the true FMV (fair market value) of the property at inception (i.e., half of $32,500) for a total return of $21,200 for a profit of $7,700 (i.e., a 57 meltdown! OK, well we do, but we are going to profit handsomely despite and because of it.